Well, let us start up. Why don't we start with prayer.
Father God, thank you for this day.
Thank you for this opportunity that we can gather together and think about you.
I ask, Lord, that this class would be edifying to the body,
that we would glorify you with our interactions,
and that we would be able to leave today with a better understanding of our fellow Christians.
In Jesus' name, amen.
Okay, so, as, you know, it's tradition now.
Let's do preamble.
So, the preamble today is basically can be summed up as, I'm inadequate.
So, this is a very complicated discussion,
and as I was preparing for today's class,
I realized that I had to truncate a whole bunch of things
to fit everything in that I wanted to fit in.
And so, I guess what I want to say is that
if a specific point that I'm making or argument that I'm making
doesn't sound particularly persuasive in the way that I have articulated it,
just know that there is an entire book on that argument that you can read
that will most likely make more sense than the way I'm putting it together.
Although, who knows? I mean, I don't know.
Okay, so with that being said, let's start our final class today,
which is going to actually start touching on what I've been hinting at in the subtitle,
which is Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution.
The last two classes, we've been dealing with sort of the historical background.
What do I mean when I say Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution?
What kind of arguments are they making?
Last class, we talked about how different biblical interpretations of Genesis
can either leave room for or not leave room for evolutionary mechanisms,
among many other things.
And now we're going to deal with the positions themselves.
But before we do that, I'd like to start with just a very simple crash course
in scientific reasoning.
Okay, so just as an explainer of how there can be differences of opinion
when it comes to scientific information,
and what does that even mean, right?
And a question that was asked in the first class,
or was it the second class?
You know, they all rub together now.
There was the question of, you know,
how can we have different interpretations of science, essentially?
And I want to explain a little bit about how that is.
So how is science actually done, right?
That is the question.
Science is very fruitful.
But it's not that science is something that does not require interpretation
or other forms of communication.
So as Christians, we believe in what is called the correspondence view of truth, right?
Which means that for something to be true, it has to correspond to reality, right?
So that is actually pretty straightforward.
But I'm just going to posit that because all of the scientific reasoning
that we are going to be talking about today,
and a lot of the arguments flowing from that,
are assuming this view of truth.
That there is something real.
There is something called reality.
reality that when we understand it,
we can gain knowledge that is true, right?
And so in science, what we're trying to do
is actually get a little piece of this reality,
get a glimpse of it,
using repetition, instrumentation,
eliminating variables,
among a whole host of other things, right?
So if I was going to try to diagram it,
it would look something like this.
We have this thing called reality, right?
It's real, you know, by definition.
Here's this thing called reality.
And in science, what we're trying to do
is we're trying to observe
some facet of this reality
using instruments, often.
You know, I mean, back in the day,
they would just use their eyeballs.
But I guess if you could, you know,
in a certain sort of reductive way,
call your eyeballs instruments, right?
But yeah, we're going to be observing reality,
some facet of reality.
Based on this observation,
this is going to give us some sort of data output, right?
And this is what kind of output you get
is going to be dependent
what kind of instrument you're using
and the way that you're trying to observe, right?
Because, believe it or not,
the observation itself
is not necessarily the data output,
although observation is a form of data, right?
But oftentimes,
the instrument is observing something
and it tells us something
about what it's observing, right?
Finally, on top of this data output,
we're going to be interpreting the output, right?
So we get this number
or this picture
or this, you know,
solution
or pellet,
whatever it is.
We get some sort of output
and on top of this output,
we are going to be
interpreting the data
to make sense
in what we already know
about the world,
to posit new facets
of how the world is working
based on the output you've gotten.
And on top of this interpretation,
we're now going to be building a worldview, right?
So this is the layer,
the layers of scientific reasoning, okay?
And so
in most scientific circles,
this is sort of seen as a,
unbreakable chain, right?
The reality
necessarily leads to,
leads to the observation,
which necessarily leads to this data output,
which necessarily
is interpreted correctly this way,
which necessarily means
in a big worldview sense,
X, right?
So,
but is that necessarily true?
Do we have to,
is it an unbreakable chain?
And, you know,
people who,
so I guess I should say
maybe the popular view of science
is that this is an unbreakable chain,
right?
People who are actually doing science
know that,
you know,
these chains are often
very, very weak.
And so,
oftentimes,
a lot of what we're trying to do
is
determine how,
you know,
how can we reliably say
that this X equals this,
right?
So,
what's the Christian's responsibility
in all of this,
right?
So,
we've talked over the last few classes
about the fact that
Scripture being our highest authority,
we were committed to the claims of Scripture,
but also Scripture testifies
to the reliability
of what we can learn from nature,
right?
And because we affirm
Scripture,
we,
in some sense,
Christians are responsible
for the realities of nature.
So,
at a very base level,
Christians are responsible
to the truth of this,
right?
This thing here,
reality,
is real,
right?
And Christians have to affirm that
at the very least,
right?
Secondly,
I would say,
to a lesser extent,
Christians are,
have to be,
by way of being intellectually honest,
we have to at least
affirm
the observations
with the instruments
and the data
that the instruments put out,
right?
Now,
the reason I say
to a lesser extent
is because
these observations
with instruments
are not the reality themselves.
These are ways
of getting at the reality
and scientists know
depending on the instrument
you use,
the reality may look different.
Depending on
the way that you use
the instrument,
the data output
might be different,
right?
And so,
these are
extrapolations
from the reality,
but they're not
the reality itself.
So,
I think,
at the very least,
Christians need
to be able to say,
yes,
there is something real
that scientists
are observing
or trying to observe
that I,
as a Christian,
must say,
that is true.
Okay?
If we think about
our last class,
this is where
the differences
between the philosophical
views about
balancing general
and special revelation
comes in
because maybe
you're thinking
about the first group
that I talked about
which would be
the science skeptics
and the science skeptics
would say,
really,
there is no way
to get from reality
to observations
with instruments,
right?
I mean,
like,
they get stuff right
sometimes,
but there really
isn't any consistent
way to get at this,
right?
But I think
most Christians
would consider
it their responsibility
to affirm
that there is
a reality
that is being
observed with
instruments
and it is putting
out some sort
of information,
okay?
So,
but,
what about
these next levels?
The interpretation
of output
and the worldview
based on Pata.
Now,
everybody,
all Christians
of all stripes,
right,
whether they be
intelligent design
advocates,
theistic evolutionists,
creationists,
they are all
going to say
the worldview,
the interpretation
to worldview
connection
is not,
is not something
that we as Christians
need to affirm
and oftentimes
we as Christians
need to fight
against that
interpretation,
right?
Even a theistic
evolutionist
would be arguing
that the scientific
materialism
that often results
from the interpretations
of the data
is not warranted.
It's a philosophical,
metaphysical argument
that is not,
that is maybe
is understandable
in light of the data
but is not required,
right?
And so,
we would all argue,
boom,
this connection
we as Christians
can argue against
and often should
be arguing against
of all stripes,
right?
obviously,
as Christians
we have to at least
argue against
scientific materialism,
right?
Otherwise,
you know,
that assumes
there is no God,
right?
And as Christians
that, you know,
puts us in a weird
position.
So,
now secondly,
now this is where
a lot of the
disagreements come in
between Christians.
As I said before,
most people would argue
that the data output
that comes out
from our observations
is something that
we need to affirm
is real in some sense,
right?
With qualifications,
right?
And scientists know
all the qualifications,
right?
Everybody,
I mean,
I don't know
about the other
scientists in the room,
but I do get annoyed
when you read
a scientific publication
and then you read
the news articles
from the scientific
publication,
right?
We've all had
this experience
in the scientific
community where you're
like,
oh man,
they did not get it.
You know,
they're not making
the kinds of
qualifications
that are necessary
to get at the
accuracy of what's
going on.
Yeah,
you could understand
the data that they
put out in the way
that you're describing,
but nobody would
actually argue that
that's actually
what's going on.
Okay?
So,
we're all familiar
with that,
but qualifications
in mind,
there are basically
two different groups
understanding
how are we going
to argue
against this
interpretation
of output.
There are Christians
who say,
this interpretation
of output
is very reliable,
right?
And then there
are Christians
who say,
I am not required
to accept this
and I'm going
to argue
my own case
against it
based on the data,
right?
So,
and this actually
comes down
to
the second
tension in creation
as I've been
talking about.
But I guess I just
want to get across
in this section
here that
it's not just
Christians who
need to be
skeptical about
this chain of
reasoning,
right?
And it's not just
Christians who are
skeptical.
Scientists are
often very
critical of
other scientists'
interpretation of
data,
especially if
your interpretation
of your own
data differs
with their
interpretation,
right?
That's when the
gloves come off
and the fighting
really begins
metaphorically.
So,
you know,
hopefully metaphorically.
So,
yeah,
we all argue
about the
interpretation of
the data.
The question is
at what point
should Christians
affirm so-called
consensus in
the interpretation
of the data?
versus not,
right?
So,
what's this
second tension
in creationism
all about?
Okay?
So,
the second tension
in creationism
I'm going to
talk about
has to do
with God's
activity,
right?
What is God's
activity?
How can we
understand it?
So,
first of all,
Christianity
asserts
that
God is active
in the world.
world.
So,
I'm just
going to
leave that,
you know,
we're going
to just
assume that
as Christians.
But how
can we,
how are we
supposed to
understand
this activity,
right?
There's actually
been a lot of
discussion
on these
arguments
with much
of the
talking
surrounding
it
talking about
what could
or could not
be a miracle.
when are we
talking about
miracles,
when are we
talking about
just regular
activity?
Is everything
a miracle?
Right?
Some Christians
would argue
yes,
right?
There is no
such thing
as like a
natural law
that has
its own
abilities,
its own
functions,
it has
ingrained
causal
abilities.
Everything
is God's
active
activity.
So,
in a sense,
everything is
a miracle,
right?
The fact
that the
laws of
nature
are in
force
is because
not that there
is such a
thing as
the law
of nature,
only because
God is
doing
the thing
that we
as scientists
observe and
say,
okay,
this is a
regular thing,
we're going
to call
this the
law of
nature,
right?
Now,
there has
been
disagreement.
Evangelical
Christians
generally
arrive at
a picture
that separates
God's
ordinary
providence
God
working
through
secondary
causation,
this is
God's
sort of
what I
was just
describing,
sustaining
the world
and its
regularities
and existence,
right?
And we
have a lot
of biblical
evidence that
this is what
God does,
okay?
So,
pretty much
everybody agrees
on this
point,
right?
That God
does sustain
the way
that the
world works,
right?
Nothing
that came
into being
would come
into being
without God
and Jesus
sustaining it,
upholding the
world,
as it were,
right?
And so
the idea
of ordinary
providence
is that
God,
in his
foreknowledge
and in
his power,
creates
things or
sustains
things using
secondary
causes,
right?
So he
creates,
for instance,
physical
things that
have certain
properties ingrained
in the physical
things that
behave with
the laws of
nature in a
certain way,
right?
Does that make
sense?
So,
in a sense,
so maybe a
way of
understanding
ordinary
providence is
to say that
when God
says that
he knit
you in
your mother's
womb,
he was being
honest,
right?
But we
also know
how,
you know,
kids,
look away
from the
thing,
how egg
and sperm
work,
right?
How embryonic
development
works,
how placental
biology
works,
right?
We know all
that stuff.
I mean,
you will
eventually.
So,
we know how
that works,
but at the
same time,
we also
understand that
it is God's
sustaining work
that maintains
the pregnancy.
It is God
active in the
secondary causes
that makes the
pregnancy work,
and this is
throughout all
of Scripture,
right?
The birth of
Isaac,
the birth of
John the
Baptist.
These are all
instances where
the people in
these situations
attribute the
pregnancy to
God's direct
activity,
but it
wasn't a
virgin birth
or a virgin
conception like
Jesus,
right?
You know,
the husband and
wife really did
love each other,
right?
So that's a way
of understanding
ordinary providence,
which all
Christians affirm.
But there is
an idea of
what's called
extraordinary
providence,
which is God's
primary activity
in the world.
And so how
can we understand
extraordinary
providence?
This is describing
God's work in
history that
extends beyond
the regular
activity in the
world, which
would include
what we would
call miracles,
right?
So we all
understand how
a baby is
conceived and
born, but we
don't understand
how, based
on just
secondary
causation,
water can
turn into
wine.
Does that
make sense?
So this is
an activity.
Water, in
general, doesn't
turn into
wine, right?
You usually
need some
grapes and
some thyme,
et cetera,
right?
But this
isn't to say
that God
necessarily
disappeared
the water
and then
reappeared
wine in
its place.
He transformed
water into
wine without
using the
normal natural
processes,
right?
He uses
primary causation
in some way.
And the
reason we
call miracles
miracles is
because they
go beyond
the normal
activity of
the world,
right?
You know,
basically
resurrections
are astounding
because dead
people have
a propensity
to stay
dead, right?
In our
normal
experience.
Now, there
actually is a
lot of
discussion,
you know,
does this
require God
to break
his own
laws,
right?
This is a
long-standing
argument among
philosophers of
religion.
In fact,
this very
question is
one of the
driving forces.
In the first
class, we
talked about
the fundamentalist
modernist
divide,
right?
Where there's
a lot of
philosophical
arguments going
on, and
one of them
was among
modernists,
the argument
that extraordinary
providence is
impossible,
right?
Extraordinary
providence is
impossible because
this would
require God
to break
his own
laws, and
that's an
inconsistency in
his character,
right?
Now, of
course, if you
follow that
logically down
the slide,
then you
stop believing
in the virgin
birth, you
stop believing
in the
miracles of
Jesus, the
resurrection of
Jesus, and
this is how a
lot of the
theologians,
such as
Bultman,
slid into
agnosticism,
if not outright
atheism,
because if
you argue
that there
is no
such thing
as a
possibility
of such
a thing
as a
miracle,
then you
come up
against those
miracles in
the Bible,
right?
So, now
the argument
is, so
most Orthodox
Christians really
aren't arguing
at this level,
we're usually
arguing at the
next level,
which is,
when is it
appropriate for
us to appeal
to an
ordinary versus
an extraordinary
called providence,
right?
And so, like I
said before,
some Christians
would argue that
everything is
extraordinary
providence,
right?
God is doing
everything actively
all the time,
not in a
sustaining way
using secondary
causation, but
in a primary
way, right?
That's one way
of understanding
it.
But, generally,
that is not,
that is,
that is not
really going to
be playing a
major role
in the sort
of evolution,
theistic evolution,
intelligent design
arguments,
right?
Although that
is a part,
so, you know,
if you're going
to be reading
the literature,
this is going
to come up.
So, but
basically,
when it comes
down to the
science of faith
discussion,
you really get
generally two
groups, right?
You get one,
you get your,
what I'm calling
providential
creationists,
which, after
having made
the PowerPoint
and all the
outlines, I
realized that I
used providence
in a different
way, just like
a slide ago.
Anyways, I was
too lazy to
redo everything.
So, I'm going
to call them
providential
creationists, but
this is basically
the argument that
God universally,
in creation,
is using secondary
causation.
He's using ordinary
providence, right?
So, God
imbued
nature with
certain properties
that is capable
of bringing to
fruition that
which he wants
to come to
fruition, okay?
In creation.
Generally, this
also is,
this also comes
with, or is a
result from,
a high confidence
in science's
ability to explain
all phenomena,
right?
So, we, you
know, we live
in a time where
science is able
to explain a
whole bunch of
different things.
And so, in the
minds of scientists
and non-scientists
alike, there is
this view that
given enough time
and enough effort,
all phenomena
that we see or
can observe can
be explained,
can be interpreted
in some sort of
naturalistic way or
in a way that
comes down to
natural things
doing natural
things resulting
in natural
things, right?
So, this is that
mechanism, that's
that assumption
of methodological
naturalism, right?
Which assumes
that in science
we're going to be
talking only about
natural causes
doing natural
things, right?
And so, if science
has made a lot of
inroads using this
assumption of
methodological
naturalism, which
again, is not like
in the bylaws of
science, but it is
philosophically an
assumption, then
maybe that will
just continue
forever and
we'll get
everything pretty
timed in.
Yeah, Ivor?
Does this put
aside God's
sovereignty?
mean, he has to
abide by certain
rules.
If he's a
sovereign of the
universe, he can
do whatever he
wants.
In principle, yes.
But the argument
they would argue
is that
God in his
foreknowledge
created materials
that in his
sovereignty would
bring to fruition
what he wanted
to bring, right?
So it's not like
he's restricting
himself.
They're saying
God is front
loading in his
creation everything
that's necessary
to bring what he
wants to bring,
right?
There's nothing
lacking in nature
to do what God
wants it to do.
Does that make
sense?
It's a sort of a
best...
In a sense, it's
limiting God with
that explanation.
I mean, that's a
way of understanding
it.
I think they would
argue that that is
a reverse...
They would argue
that that's...
What you're saying
is a limitation of
God because what
you're saying is
that God couldn't
create something
that could do what
he wants it to do.
He would have to
actively intervene,
right?
I'm not saying that
that's a very...
I'm not saying that
that's the correct
argument.
Yeah, I mean,
right.
It's a philosophical
disagreement, right?
And it's going to
come down to batting
back and forth in
that way.
So along with
science's ability
to explain information
or the phenomena,
there's also sort of
an assumption of a
causally closed
universe.
If you're a
philosophy-minded
person, basically
that means that
everything is in a
chain of cause and
effect and that
that chain of cause
and effect can't be
broken.
Anyways, if you're
interested in that,
you can ask the
question afterwards.
That's problematic.
It is problematic.
So Orthodox
Christians will
acknowledge that
extraordinary providence
is a thing, but
they tend to
restrict this to
what they would
consider theologically
important situations,
right?
So they would say,
oh yeah, to be an
Orthodox Christian,
you have to believe in
the virgin birth of
Jesus Christ and his
resurrection.
These are miracles.
These are instances
of extraordinary
providence, but
these are occurring
because God has a
human audience that
he is then trying to
give theological
information to,
right?
And in creation, we
don't have that
argument.
That's their argument.
The next group is
what I'm calling
designing creationists,
which again, I'm
actually not very
happy with that idea.
Yeah.
Lay down,
Amos.
Question on the
last slide.
Yeah.
How does quantum
mechanics play a role
in these arguments
where there are
phenomena that don't
have?
How's that?
Yeah.
So that's a great
question.
In fact, in Alvin
Plantaga's book,
Where the Conflict
Really Lies, he's
going to argue that
a causally closed
universe is
scientifically, well,
philosophically
unwarranted,
scientifically unwarranted,
and now, given our
understanding of quantum
mechanics, doesn't
really make any sense
because we're not
talking about strict
cause and effect,
we're talking about
probabilities of
effect.
There are some
arguments against
that.
I don't have enough
time to go into
how some
interpretations of
quantum mechanics
result in
potentially a still
causally closed
universe.
They would argue
that the particles
themselves, while
acting unpredictably,
have their own
causally determined
properties that are
then resulting in
what we would call
unpredictability,
which on that
back end is not
actually unpredictable.
Those are very
in the multiverse
direction, right?
Yeah, I mean, they
go multiverse, or
they're going to
argue about
different fundamental
properties of the
particles themselves,
and how the
particles themselves
are then, how
they come into
being, right?
So you can imagine
a situation when you
have a chain of
cause and effect
that produces this
particle that then
has unpredictable
properties that, on
the macro scale,
events in phenomena
that are then
understandable under
cause and effect.
So they would
bring the causally
closeness back
words.
Does that make
sense?
If it doesn't make
sense, it's because
it barely makes
sense to me.
But moving on,
we got designing
creationists.
I like that question
that Amos, by the
way.
Designing
creationists, as you
might imagine,
believe that God
creates through a
combination of
primary and
secondary causation.
And we're talking
about creation
here, right?
Because I just
mentioned, Orthodox
Christians who are
of the providential
stripe will acknowledge
extraordinary stuff, but
only in really
theological situations,
right?
But designing
creationists are more
comfortable with God
having primary and
secondary causation in
creation.
Usually, this is
accompanied with a
less sanguine
outlook on what
science could
ultimately predict.
They would believe
that science will
not be able to
explain all
phenomena.
And therefore,
they would also
posit a causally
unclosed universe.
But again, the
philosophy of that is
weird.
But anyways, they
would say that they
would be looking for
recognizable signs of
God's activity in
nature because they're
going to be open to
primary causation in
creation if not
looking for it.
And Orthodox
Christians of this
position, they also
will affirm ordinary
providence and how
important it has been
in history.
They just don't think
it's the whole
McCoy.
It's not the whole
picture.
So, with that
background in mind,
just keep those two
groups sort of in
your mind.
I mean, it's pretty
obvious how they
cash out in the
theistic evolution
versus Intel
design argument.
But it is going to
be interesting, I
think, at the end
to bring it all
home to what I
think is this
disagreement about
what does it mean
for God to be
active in creation.
So, let's talk
about theistic
evolution.
I'm going to
give an overview
of how theistic
evolution arguments
generally work.
And then I'm going
to give two
arguments.
I'm looking at the
time.
I'm going to give
two arguments for
theistic evolution.
And then I'm going
to go over what
are usually the
general critiques of
the view.
And then I'm going
to do the same for
intelligent design.
And then I'm going
to close.
So, we're going to
go quick.
All right.
So, what is the
basic form of a
theistic evolutionary
argument?
I'm going to call
it TE just to save
my mouth.
So, baseline, as we
talked about on
class one, they're
going to assume the
verifiable truth of
macroevolution.
Okay?
So, just, that's
that.
So, we're not really
going to try to
think about it not
being true.
They're going to
assume that it's
true.
Okay?
So, if we go back
to our thoughts of
scientific reasoning,
they accept the
interpretations of
the data output of
a variety of
different sources,
anthropology,
paleontology,
biology, geology.
Anyways, therefore,
usually the argument
comes in two
propositions,
generally.
Right?
The propositions are,
one, the evolutionary
interpretation of the
science is true, and
two, the biblical
account is also true.
Right?
So, these two, this is
the basic form of the
argument, right?
Not all of their
arguments are for these
specific propositions,
but that's generally
how it goes.
So, usually, when you
read TE literature,
you're going to be
looking at two
specific elements of
evolutionary thinking
paired with a
specific overlap area
of theology.
So, for instance, to
give an example,
you know, proposition
one could be evolution
of humanity is true
versus proposition
two, man was made in
the image of God.
Okay?
Those both are true.
The TE position is
now I'm going to
explain why that can
be true.
Does that make sense?
So, you know, just
plug in any
evolutionary
interpretation in here,
plug in any
biblical interpretation
here that you think
are going to overlap
and then your argument
is these are going to
be coherent.
Okay?
Somehow.
Right?
And then the specifics
of how that works is
going to depend on the
specific argument being
made and how they make
that argument, obviously.
So, I don't have time to
go through a lot of
these different arguments.
arguments.
I want to give you two
high-level arguments.
Oh, I already said that.
Okay.
So, just imagine that I'm
saying it again.
And they're going to work
about philosophically,
theologically.
Again, right?
Because it's not a
scientific position, TE.
It is a philosophical,
theological position.
Right?
So, the concert of
these two propositions
is going to come down
to the philosophy,
interpretation, etc.
So, I want to give
two big-picture arguments.
These two big-picture
arguments, I think,
give us an understanding
of the macro-level
argument for the big
picture of evolution
and the big picture
of scripture.
Right?
So, these are going to
basically come down to
evolution occurred
and two, God created
the world.
Right?
So, these are the two
propositions that I'm
going to be dealing with
with two different kinds
of arguments.
And then, just to give
you a flavor about how
this cashes out,
and then we're going to
talk about criticisms.
Again, the breadth
of this position is so
wide that you're going
to find people who
will argue these two
propositions in
completely different
ways.
And then they're going
to argue with each
other over how your
solution to this
problem, or this
coherence, is wrong,
but mine is right.
Okay?
So, I'm not pretending
to sort of present
this is the unified
front of theistic
evolution.
In fact, probably the
two arguments I'm going
to put forward
forward, they're not
mutually exclusive,
but the people who
would argue for one or
the other probably
wouldn't agree with
each other.
So, anyways, again,
that's just the nature
of this position.
So, the first one is
going to be pretty
hard, and it's going
to be dry.
So, prepare yourself.
This is a philosophical
argument.
Okay?
So, and I've tried to
boil it down, but again,
there's an entire book
on it.
So, the book you're
going to want to read
if you want more on
this is Where the
Conflict Really Lies
with Alvin Plantinga,
where he famously
puts forward this
argument.
So, this is how the
argument goes.
Humans have cognitive
faculties such as
memory, perception,
intuition, introspection,
testimony, sympathy,
moral sense, etc.
You can go along the
lines, and we all
intuitively understand
our cognitive faculties
to be mostly reliable.
Right?
We believe that our
memories are able to
give us reliable
information, if not
perfect information.
We believe that our
ability to perceive the
world is perceiving a
real world.
It's not an imaginary
world.
Right?
We make predictions
based on these.
Our intuition about
logic, mathematics,
these are what we
consider to be reliable.
Our introspection about
our own mental states,
our own thoughts and
feelings, we believe is
reliable, etc.
We can learn from
testimony from other
people to teach us
things.
Now, here's where it
gets complicated.
Naturalism, which I'm
going to call N because
I didn't have space on
the slide to keep on
writing naturalism.
Naturalism N posits
that these faculties are
merely neurophysiological
properties.
Okay?
Now, depending on how
you make the argument
from materialism, you're
going to either be a
reductive or an irreductive
unreductive?
Nonreductive.
That's the one.
Some prefix reductive
materialist, right?
You're going to be
arguing either that the
mental, the cognitive
faculties are
neurophysiological
properties or that they
are neurophysiological
properties that also
unrelatedly produce a
mental state that has
some sort of content.
Again, there's an entire
book.
Read it.
For the time being,
naturalism posits
faculties are merely
neurophysiological
properties.
Okay?
That's one.
Two, evolution, which
I'm calling E, does not
select for faculties that
are true.
They select for only
advantageous behaviors.
Right?
Evolution doesn't care
whether you think that
your mental states or
that your ability to
remember five seconds
ago is true.
They only care that you
don't do stuff that's
going to get you killed.
Does that make sense?
Right?
So you could believe
anything.
You could believe that
everything in the whole
world is purple.
Right?
But as long as you eat,
as long as you reproduce,
as long as you survive and
are able to function,
you're going to be doing
well in life.
Okay?
This is a well-known
effect of evolution that
it only selects for
functional behavior.
It does not select for
content.
Right?
So, this is where it
gets confusing, but
follow with me.
If naturalism and
evolution are both true,
then we have good reason
to believe that our
mental faculties are not
reliable.
Because there are
neurophysiological
properties that are only
selected based on their
fitness.
They're not selected based
on their connection to
reality.
Right?
How close your
neurophysiological properties
are to a quote-unquote
truth is unrelated to how
they're going to affect
your fitness in the
evolutionary process.
That's the argument.
So, if both
naturalism and evolution
are both true, and we
have good reason to
believe that, to doubt
our own cognitive
faculties, then that
means that we have a
reason to doubt our
understanding that
naturalism and evolution
are true, or any
proposition is true.
Therefore, if naturalism
and evolution are both
true, then we have a good
reason to believe that
they are both not true.
Does that make sense?
Sort of.
Does that make sense?
Again, this is an
argument.
Right?
So, this isn't a given.
Alvin Plantinga is arguing
that this is true.
So, if you read his book,
he's going to argue for the
fact that naturalism posits
neurophysiological
properties.
He's going to argue that
evolution does not select
for true cognitive
faculties, only faculties that
are advantageous
behaviorally.
right?
I find his arguments
persuasive.
You may not, but this is
how the argument goes.
Right?
Does that make sense to
everybody?
How if evolution is both,
if naturalism and evolution
are both true, then naturalism
and evolution are both
false.
Does that make sense?
So, how does the theistic
evolution get in here?
Sorry, go ahead.
Before you even went on to
your second statement there,
it says evolution does not
select for faculties that are
true, only those that
produce advantageous
behaviors.
You could have stopped
right there and I would
have said, oh yeah,
that's totally contradictory.
Yes.
Yeah.
But, remember, this is a
philosopher.
He can't stop there.
He's got to go, he's got to
have at least nine different
parts to his syllogism.
Otherwise, other philosophers
will say, hey.
Sorry, yeah.
I just wanted to, it's not
just Alvin Plantinga, right?
Like, this is a very common
old argument.
I remember C.S. Lewis
making this argument and it
comes up a lot.
I love you, Tom.
This is, okay.
Watch this, okay?
Check this out.
You're predictive.
Okay.
So, this is the basis of the
argument, right?
So, now, based on this
argument, you can argue
either naturalism is true and
evolution is false or
evolution is true and
naturalism is false.
Does that make sense?
You can't have them both
together based on this
argument.
Now, since theistic
evolution assumes the
truth of evolution, right?
We already argued that.
We didn't argue that.
I just posited that.
That's the truth.
This argument necessitates
the fact that naturalism is
false.
Therefore, some sort of
theism, some naturalism is
not true.
Therefore, most likely theism
is true.
Does that make sense?
How evolution, the truth of
evolution could lead
philosophically to the belief
that God must exist in some
sense, right?
So, as Tom pointed out, this
is actually a formal way of
articulating C.S.
Lewis's own intuitive
disagreement with naturalistic
evolution, in which basically
he was saying that if we're
just a collection of atoms
bumping in the night, then why
should we care at all what two
atoms rubbing together think?
Right?
So, if you're arguing for
naturalistic evolution to me, in
which you're saying that I'm just
a collection, an interesting
collection of atoms altogether,
and you're in a different
interesting collection of atoms
altogether, his argument is,
why do I have to listen to
your atoms?
Right?
It undermines the bases of
rational thinking.
Okay.
That's argument one.
Again, there are arguments for
it.
The next argument for theistic
evolution I'm going to present is
what I call the fine-tuning in
convergent evolution argument.
So, in evolutionary theory, there is a
phenomenon known as convergence.
What is convergence?
Well, I'll tell you.
Convergence is where genetically and
historically isolated populations give
rise to animals, to functions that are
very eerily similar.
Okay?
So, we can look at the macro scale and
say, we got wolves here who look very
wolf-like.
We have hyenas here who also are looking
pretty similar.
And we also have what is now an extinct
organism, the Tasmanian tiger, which I
think should be called the Tasmanian
wolf, but whatever.
So, you have three different groups.
Right?
And maybe you're thinking on the
evolutionary paradigm they are closely
related and therefore, you know, they're
just modifications of each other.
Well, in fact, if you use the genetics,
phylogenetically, which is a fancy way of
saying evolutionary relationship between
these three is actually very distant.
Okay?
They're not actually related.
Well, I mean, if you take universal
common ancestry, everything is related.
Right?
But that's not the point.
What I'm pointing out is that
evolutionarily they're not in the same
tree.
They're on a different branch.
Right?
But they look incredibly similar and they
do exactly the same job in their
environments.
And their environments are not
particularly similar.
You know, the Tasmanian dude, he's
living out in Australia, which is not
known for being the same as Northwest.
Right?
I mean, I've never been to Australia.
I'm sure it's very nice.
I mean, unless you like Australia, which
Northwest is not very nice.
Anyways.
And then you have the hyena, which is
living in a different environment.
And so the argument is this phenomenon
that everybody, all evolutionists, will
acknowledge this is something that has
happened.
Right?
It's not in controversy that these three
different species are unrelated, although
they look very similar and do very similar
things.
And this isn't the only example I could
give.
I could give examples of different sort of
functions, sort of echolocation.
Right?
Echolocation is a very rare way of hunting,
but there's a whole bunch of different
unrelated organisms in evolutionary theory
have developed echolocation in their own
way, like bats and whales and not whales.
I think there's bug.
There's some kind of bug that does it, too.
What's up?
Well, no, that's not right.
I don't even know.
I don't know.
I am a biologist.
I don't even know what I'm talking about.
Okay.
So based on these observations, a theistic
evolutionary advocate will argue that
evolution isn't as random as is proposed by
materialists.
And in fact, while the mechanism of
evolution is in one sense random because
of the mutations and the natural selection,
there seems to be some sort of fine-tuning
of the whole process, some sort of
constraint on the whole process that
produces specific animal forms consistently.
And this would be very unlikely on
naturalism if it were to be true.
Right?
On naturalism, you would expect evolution to
be very contingent, which is another way of
saying a very random, historically
unpredictable situation.
But on convergent evolution, it seems like
no matter where you are, things, the
evolutionary process sort of gives you the
same results in a way, depending on no
matter where you go.
Right?
And so the TE advocate would argue that this
implies that evolution had us in mind, which
is harmonious with belief in God and it's less
likely based on theism.
Whew.
Okay.
Does everybody understand that?
Make sense?
Okay.
Let's move on to general critiques of theistic
evolution.
The first of which, and again, the TE group is
very broad.
Right?
So, you know, there are people within the
group who are very orthodox.
There are people in the group who are not as
orthodox.
What the general critique of it is, is that it, as a
worldview, depending on how much of the
interpretations of the data and the corresponding
worldview that you accept leaks into your
theology.
Right?
So, examples of this.
TE advocates often argue that human beings
didn't originate from a single population.
Some do, some don't.
But this can undermine human uniqueness.
Another way of, another group may posit that
Adam and Eve didn't exist in any sense, which
produces theological problems in a variety of
different ways.
It's not intractable theological problems, but
it's not, it's, it's, it does provide some
issues.
Right?
Additionally, many have challenged the idea of
original innocence, that human beings were made
morally good or morally innocent, which, in
contrast, sort of undermines the entire idea of the
doctrine of original sin.
In some ways, it would argue against a fall, which
would then give us the doctrine of original sin.
And concomitantly, you often get TE advocates that will
argue for an alternative atonement than
substitutionary atonement, which is the, the, the,
basically the gospel as understood by evangelicals.
Right?
Is substitutionary atonement.
Not that there are other atonements aren't in
activity, but in the gospel, substitutionary
atonement plays a major part.
Right?
And then, maybe you would argue that this is an
unfair criticism of theistic evolution because
there have been different arguments for atonement in
the entire history of Christianity.
And I would argue that that's true.
Although, basically there are two major themes in
Orthodox Christianity for atonement.
In the Western side, we have substitutionary
atonement.
On the Eastern side, we have kenosis.
Am I doing that right, Tom?
Is that unrelated?
Okay.
I mean, it's similar.
Yeah.
So.
Ancestral sin instead of original sin.
Right.
And then the idea is not that God is here to, to
atone for moral sins, law-breaking, but to
atone for death by introducing life.
If you want to learn more about that, Athanasius.
Yes.
Can you clarify what's meant by original
innocence?
Since we wouldn't describe sin to a lion eating the
buffalo that it finds.
Yeah.
So they would argue that, that modern humans, as we
understand them, were never innocent.
Right?
Different strains of...
What does the word innocent mean?
So the word innocent means that they, they had
not sinned until the fall, basically.
So there were, they did nothing morally evil until
the fall occurred, which introduced in original
sin.
Right?
So in an evolutionary and some assessments of, of
the evolution of humanity, you're going to get
modern humans, you know, killing and other
untoward things, other human beings.
And that is an important or essential part in the
history of the evolution of humanity.
Right?
And so depending on how, where you place humanity,
right?
Because that is an open question in evolutionary
arguments.
At what point do hominins become modern humans?
And there's a whole debate over that.
And it's not very clear.
But depending on where you fall on that, on the
theistic evolutionary side, that's going to depend,
determine whether or not you believe that there was
such a thing as original innocence.
Whether human beings were ever made morally
innocent.
Does that make sense?
Right?
So does that exclude sin as a possibility?
Or does that just mean that we were always pretty
messed up?
Yeah.
So that would argue that we were pretty messed up
from the beginning.
Right?
That's the kind of argument I'm talking about here.
Now there are other kinds of arguments that say
in some sense sin had been influencing the evolutionary
process.
And so the story of Genesis is really an argument about
how that sin in the process of nature affected human
beings, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
Right?
Is there any sense where like, oh yeah, the devil, he came in
and messed things up?
That's a very common position.
Well, I wouldn't say very common, but it is a common
position.
But that's not even restricted to theistic evolutionists,
actually.
That's also a creationist position, depending on the group,
who argue that, so for instance, if you're an old earth
creationist, you're going to be more open to the idea of the
devil influencing the history of the world in which you get
extinctions and et cetera.
Right?
Again, depending on what kind of old earth creationist you are.
This next one, potentially enhancing the problem of evil,
depending on, again, the TE argument you make.
On some formulations of TE, the world as it is now is the way
it should be.
Right?
There has been no cataclysmic sort of fall.
The evolutionary process as it works today, as we imagine it
working backwards in time, is the way that God meant it to be.
Right?
So that implies that natural evil, and possibly even moral evil of
human beings, depending on whether you believe there was original
innocence in human beings, are part of God's good creation.
Right?
Now, a TE advocate would say, well, theistic evolution suffers from the
problem of evil like everybody else does.
And they suffer in many of the same ways as old earth creationism does.
But in this specific way, there is a difference, because many in the
creationist camps would argue that in some sense the fall of human beings,
if not the fall of creation, depending on how you understand that, has affected the
way that nature works.
And so if you were to study nature now and extrapolate backwards, you would get a bad
picture of history.
As opposed to the TE argument, often, which says, no, we get an accurate picture of the
way history was.
That's just good, in a sense.
Does that make sense?
And so now, this leads to very interesting and possibly problematic views of atonement.
So if we're talking about alternate views of atonement, based on this understanding of
the problem of evil, this version of atonement imagines that the crucifixion of Jesus in God
is God, in some sense, taking responsibility for his creation by entering into our suffering.
Right?
He says, God's good creation creates this suffering in this TE argument.
And in the crucifixion, God is not staying separate.
He is entering into the suffering of creation as a way of taking responsibility for his creative
act, which I think can lead to a variety of theological problems.
Yeah, lay it on me.
I know we've got to move on, but just real quick, would this idea that the nature of
the way it should be, which includes natural or moral evil, being good, does that lend itself
to sort of like moral progressivism?
Like, well, we just need to keep getting better and better until, you know, we fix everything.
Yeah, I mean, that is one way of doing it, is one way of understanding it.
The problem is, and I think that's a legitimate argument, the problem is, how do we score
that view with the view of scripture?
Right?
Right.
Yeah.
So, I mean, that's my point about it being a theological problem.
Right.
Because, I mean, many of the TE arguments make logical sense and philosophical sense.
The problem is, if we're thinking about the biblical theology that we get based on our
last class with Nick and my good friend Tyler, how do you get those streams, how do you get
those storylines, those narratives in the Bible, if that's what's going on?
Right.
Okay.
I'm going to get to the arguments of intelligent design, and I'm going to fly through them,
because we can't leave the building after 1025.
Okay.
Basics of ID arguments.
So, in the same sense that I outlined how TE arguments go, I'm going to argue how ID
arguments go.
ID arguments can come in two streams.
And, again, they're scientific arguments, as they would construe them.
So, they're going to use scientific evidence to posit design in nature in two different
ways.
They can use negative arguments.
Negative arguments means that they seek to make naturalistic explanations of scientific
data, the data output that we talked about earlier, make those naturalistic interpretations
less likely, and on average make theism more likely.
Positive arguments that provide empirical evidence that suggests that design is more likely.
You see how that works?
There's sort of mirror images of each other, but there is a difference.
Right?
To say, this naturalistic mechanism is not likely, is not the same as saying, this phenomenon that
we see gives me evidence of design.
Does that make sense?
I think there's a place for both of them.
I think they both have their own potential flaws.
But, either form of this argument is going to be using the inductive interpretative scientific
method in history called inference to the best explanation.
Right?
So, in the historical sciences, you have a phenomenon that you're trying to explain.
What you do is you fan out a whole variety of different hypotheses of what could explain
this.
And, inference to the best explanation is the interpretative method in which you say, how
do you decide between these different hypotheses?
Right?
And so, ID arguments trade on this form of reasoning to argue that, given a variety of hypotheses
for a specific phenomenon, the inference to the best explanation is going to give us
some sort of design.
Some sort of intelligent agency.
So, I'm not going to give you negative arguments, because I think that they have their own issues
that are, and they're less interesting.
So, maybe two positive arguments.
I'm going to focus on two arguments that are often used.
These are sort of the bread and butter, you might say, of the ID position.
And these different arguments can actually be applied to different fields in different ways.
So, I'm going to be focusing on the biochemistry side of things, because that's what I do, or
that's what I've done, or, I don't know.
That's not who I am, but, you know, you get my point.
I'm a biochemist.
I guess I am a biochemist.
What am I, what am I, I'm not fooling myself.
Okay.
So, the first argument is going to be complex specified information in DNA.
Okay.
So, what are we talking about when we say complex specified information?
Well, according to information theory, there are two components that can modify what we
call information and give it different properties.
Okay.
These two, as you might guess, are complexity, which describes the improbability of a configuration
or sequence of characters.
Specificity, which is a configuration fitting to an independent pattern that conveys meaning.
Okay.
You can have a complex information that's not specific.
You can have specific information that's not complex.
And you can also have complex specified information.
Okay.
What does that look like?
This is very complex.
In this understanding of complex.
Okay.
I just literally took my keyboard and went, okay.
But, so you say it's random.
Complexity and randomness are not in opposition.
Right.
When we say complexity, we mean the likelihood, if we're doing probabilities, the likelihood of
this sequence of characters is very, very low.
It's very improbable.
Right.
Because how many letters are other than the alphabet?
I'm really asking.
I totally forget.
26.
Okay.
How many sections are there in the sequence?
We got, you know, I'm not going to do the math.
But anyways, for every position of here, there's a, the likelihood is 1 to the 26 that you're
going to get this one compounded across the section.
It's very improbable.
It's the same thing as looking at a giant pile of rocks and saying the likelihood that they
landed in exactly that position is very low.
Right.
You couldn't, probability wise, you couldn't place them in that order to try to get that
configuration.
Right.
It's just astronomically hard to do.
The next example is specified information.
This means something to us.
Right.
Two.
It corresponds to a preexisting standard that we can apply to.
Right.
Two.
We know it's a word.
It means something.
Right.
Two.
I'm not going to describe it.
Anyways, you guys get it.
Two.
But it's specified, but it's not complex.
Right.
The, the likelihood of a T being next to an O are actually not that hard given randomness.
Right.
You're just kind of like, you know, if you're, I don't know if you've ever been bored at
the computer trying to write and you just do this, you're going to get T twos.
You're going to get thes.
You're going to get wees.
Right.
Very short sequences that correspond to what we would call a separate thing.
Right.
Now, complex specified information is information that is both complex and specified.
Right.
It's very unlikely to get this sequence in a row if you're just playing on your computer.
And also, if you see this sequence in a row, it means something to you.
Right.
It is not just random stuff in a row.
You're like, oh, I get information from that.
Right.
So how does this go into ID?
When information is both complex and specified, it is universally the product of intelligence.
Complex specified information does not occur under this understanding from random processes.
At the very least, at the base, you're going to find intelligence as the, as the result of it.
So DNA, this argument goes, contains complex specified information in the form of nucleotide triplets that serve to represent amino acids and protein coding sequences.
Right.
And this isn't an analogy.
This is actually true.
The triplets, the sequences in DNA form triplets.
And these triplets have no physiological connection to each other.
There's no necessary reason why these three should be next to each other or why the chemistry of these three makes a difference.
Right.
So the sequence is, is complex.
Right.
And it's specified because these specific nucleotides next to each other mean glutamine.
Right.
So based on this argument, therefore, inferring to the best explanation.
Right.
That's the way that ID arguments work.
Inferring to the best explanation, DNA originates from intelligent agency because given hypotheses, different hypotheses for the origin of DNA.
The likelihood of there being complex specified information outside of intelligence is low.
But the existence of complex specified information on intelligence is very high.
So if you're going to choose between them, intelligence design, intelligence is the best explanation.
Right.
What's that I hear?
Yes.
This does reject methodological naturalism.
Right.
If you're on methodological naturalism, intelligent agency is not a possibility.
Not a possible hypothesis.
So now among the non-intelligent group, you're going to have to choose between those options about what's the most likely hypothesis.
Right.
But if we understood, remember from section one or class one, methodological naturalism is not necessary to science.
So if you reject that assertion and include intelligent agency into the possible hypotheses, that is the best explanation.
Okay.
Irreducible complexity of a biochemical, biomechanical machine, I should say.
So what is irreducible complexity?
Okay.
The way to understand irreducible complexity is it's a quality in a system where that system is dependent on multiple independent parts that produce a single function.
Where each part has no function separate from the parts in the whole.
Okay.
Classic example is the mousetrap.
I know it's old and everybody does it, but it's a good example just to get our heads around the idea.
Right.
Each of these different components together is necessary for the mousetrap to do its single function, which is, unfortunately, to trap the mouse.
Or fortunately, depending if you have a mouse problem.
I lived in a house with a mouse problem.
We never used mousetraps, but at a certain point you start to be like, okay, they ate my lazy boy chair.
I'm getting close to throwing mousetraps everywhere.
Anyways, so this piece right here is meant to release once the cheese is disturbed, which is going to release this piece, which is going to go forward because of the spring, which is then attached to the base.
And every one of these parts is necessary for the mousetrap to do its function, but separately they don't do anything by themselves.
Okay.
So, how is this an argument for ID?
There are examples of irreducibly complex systems in biology by argument, such as multiprotein complexes.
So, for instance, you've got your ATP synthase.
Right?
Everybody knows what that is.
Right?
Of course.
No, but ATP synthase is a motor that when stimulated by protons moving across a gradient, biologists, you know what I'm talking about.
Basically, it spins and it can convert low energy molecules into high energy molecules.
And these high energy molecules are what is necessary for biology to happen.
Right?
Because we're very unlikely, cells are very unlikely states of entropy and you need high energy to get them from.
Anyways, I'm going through too much information here.
But anyways, it's a very complex machine.
Each of these different parts does its own thing.
Separate from the machine, separate from the whole, these different parts don't do anything.
Right?
They don't produce a function such as converting something from low energy to high energy.
Right?
So, another example is the famous flagellum.
It's a motor, spins the thing to let the bacteria move along.
Okay?
I'm not going to spend a whole lot of time on that.
Because it's not necessary for the argument.
All that needs to be true for the argument to be true is that each of these different components are necessary altogether to produce a function.
And without one of these different components, the function would not occur in any sense.
Okay.
Irradiably complex systems are impossible to produce in a step-by-step Darwinian mechanism.
As each component in the right order are all necessary to function, but they have no independent function.
So, if you imagine the Darwinian mechanism as normally understood, each step in the mutation selection system is selecting for function.
Right?
That's what selection is separating.
But you cannot produce a step-by-step machine that only functions when all the steps are together.
Does that make sense?
So, to step-by-step add each part to the system, you need to have foresight that the end product is going to be functionally helpful.
But natural selection is unguided, does not have that foresight, and therefore cannot produce irreducibly complex systems.
Okay?
Therefore, intelligence agents, but we know that intelligence agents are capable of producing irreducibly complex systems.
We invented the mousetrap.
Right?
It's not like we were sitting around, and we had all these different parts, and we're like, oh, you know.
No.
We knew when we put together the mousetrap, not us specifically, but human beings, intelligent agents knew what they were trying to produce.
Therefore, inferring to the best explanation, irreducibly complex systems are the result of intelligent agency.
Again, spread out the hypotheses, pick the one that makes the most sense.
That's the idea for an intelligent design argument.
Okay.
Moving on to general critiques.
I'm flying through them.
I know, I'm sure we all could think of objections to any different parts of all these different arguments.
I'm trying to put forward the arguments as stated.
So, one of the general critiques of intelligent design is the God of the gaps fallacy,
which essentially states that when we don't know what happened, we just insert God into the system,
and that is the best explanation at that point because all the other explanations are very bad.
Right?
And this is actually, this criticism is valid when the gap is due to ignorance.
However, the argument goes, there are gaps that are not due to ignorance.
Potentially.
Or are there.
Are all gaps due to ignorance.
Second, tension in creationism should be floating in your mind when I ask you that question, right?
Whether we decide whether there's a gap of ignorance or not.
Second, we got bad theology.
Okay?
This criticism comes in many different forms.
One form says that by arguing for the apparent design of different features of nature,
ID proponents are actually creating a dichotomy between that which God has created and that which he has not created.
Right?
And as Christians, we believe that God has created everything.
So this creates sort of a bad dichotomy in theology for the activity of God.
Another critique is to imply that God did not create a world that was sufficient for his purposes.
God needed to intervene.
And doesn't that mean that God was an ineffective creator if he has to intervene in his creation to institute a change that he wants?
Couldn't he have just front-loaded everything?
Isn't he powerful enough to do that?
And finally, this is actually sort of a heavy philosophical argument.
So if you're into that kind of thing, get ready.
So there's an argument that ID assumes the mechanistic nature of the modern view of the universe.
And therefore, by God creating in the way that ID proponents argue, that makes God into a too-imminent anthropomorphic sort of deity.
If that doesn't make any sense to you, it's probably because you're not Catholic.
Okay.
As opposed to transcendent and other?
As opposed to, yes, transcendent, other.
This argument is usually put forward by classical theists who argue that God is not imminent in the way that we are imminent.
In the sense that he doesn't work the way that we work.
To impose ideas on God based on our own activity is to anthropomorphize God.
Okay.
Summing up.
We got through it.
Technically, almost 15 minutes over.
So, how does second tension in creationism help us understand these different views?
Right?
If you're a providential creationist, they're not going to find any ID arguments convincing.
Because a priori, meaning before the fact, God is asserted to work through secondary causation.
Based on this view, you're not going to find any gaps that are not due to ignorance.
Right?
The other kind of gap we could talk about would be a gap due to the nature of the cause.
Right?
Sort of a gap between water and wine.
We know water doesn't turn into wine.
Right?
There's a gap due to the nature of the substance and the activity that it produces.
And so, to infer intelligent agency there is legitimate.
But in creation, a providential creationist is to say there is no gaps due to the nature.
There is a secondary causation that can cause everything.
Because God did use secondary causation to cause everything.
Does that make sense?
Okay.
A designing creationist is going to be more comfortable with ID.
Surprisingly.
I mean, not surprisingly.
And perhaps not feel the need to take what they would consider potential theological risks of TE.
Right?
If I'm comfortable with God doing primary causation in history,
I am not wedded to the specific interpretations of the data that is being produced.
Therefore, I can criticize the interpretation, put forward my own interpretation,
and that keeps me safe from these potentially theological problems.
Right?
You can imagine this actually makes dialogue between ID and TE advocates very difficult.
Right?
This second tension.
Right?
Because you're going to have an ID person arguing scientifically, no, here is a gap due to nature.
And you're going to have a TE person arguing, there are no such things as gaps due to nature.
Right?
So, hopefully after this, no matter where you are on either position,
you can at least understand how a Christian can come to this position,
why they come to this position,
and maybe argue for your position based on their own assumptions,
and try to convince them on that way,
as opposed to producing an argument based on your own assumptions,
which is probably not going to get anywhere.
Does that make sense?
Okay.
That was the goal of the whole class.
Okay.
Thank you.
That's it.
Alright.
Questions afterwards.
This is actually already over time.
But if you have a question, I'll answer it in the next five minutes.
Can I just reiterate, you need to go, leave in a car, do that now.
Yes.
Yes, because you have ten minutes to leave before the run starts.
Really, you should be leaving now to get out in time.
Leave now, as opposed to the station of second service.
Right.
That's right.
Yeah.
I'm saying to the second service, we're good.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Yeah.
Or if you want to hang around until 1115.
No, I just want to make sure.
See you, Tom.
Second service is good.
I was waiting to have a question.
Oh, you have a question.
Lay it on me.
I was going to ask about the providential creationists.
Yeah.
So, how are they materially or substantially different from deists?
If they think that God just set everything up from the beginning and everything is secondary
and that he doesn't interfere, he doesn't come in in a personal, imminent way, to me,
that's deism, right?
I mean, isn't that...
So, yeah, it depends on how you're going to argue for that.
Because some would argue that God, in his sustaining of nature, that is activity, right?
God is, through his will, sustaining the natural properties of these different things.
And therefore, their activity is ultimately a result of God's activity.
And to say that God is hands-off is not true.
He has to be hands-on.
Otherwise, everything falls apart.
I see.
Okay.
The other thing there is...
The providential creationists are just saying, in creation, God is just working through secondary causes.
He only steps in and does the miracle thing at theologically opportune times.
So, they're not being full-on deists.
You can think of it kind of as deists about the process of biological creation.
Okay.
And some would be comfortable with that assessment, being called deists for creation.
Others would be very... would be rankled, if you call them a deist on creation.
So, there is difference.
There are some who are like, oh, yeah, for sure.
I'm a deist, essentially, until it comes into history, right?
Yeah.
Any other questions?
Lay it on me.
Maybe this is a sticking point about the imminent versus transcendent argument.
And I know that's more of a theological and philosophical thing.
Oh, yeah.
Doesn't matter.
Doesn't mean it's not important.
Well, sure.
And maybe I just need to do more background, not research on that whole debate.
But doesn't the dual divine human nature of Jesus sort of help us with that supposed dichotomy?
Like, that God is both imminent and transcendent?
Yeah.
But they would argue, if you're a classical theist, that that is restricted to history.
So, post-incarnation, God in his humanity in Jesus, we can anthropomorphize.
Well, he is.
It's not anthropomorphizing.
He's human.
Right.
So, attributing human traits to Jesus is legitimate.
They would argue pre-incarnation to attribute human traits to God is to anthropomorphize him.
Before he's anthropomorphized in the ultimate sense.
Why is this a problem?
Well, that is a great question.
Why is it a problem?
It's based on the actual, your view of God.
Right.
So, on the classical theist position, you have divine simplicity, impassibility, and timelessness.
And these three together form a view of God in which God is transcendent.
And the creation is sort of a causal eminence of God.
And God is not changed by the creation.
That's the impassibility part.
Right.
God is not changed by his activity of creation.
Think of creation in this view.
Creation is like a shadow and God is the real thing.
Right.
The thing doesn't change because of the shadow.
Right.
And so, to say that God is fiddling with the shadow seems to assume that God is changing.
And that's not allowed.
Does that make sense?
Yeah.
Remind me just one more thing.
Remind me what a classical theist is again.
Yeah.
I'm getting lost in all the definitions today.
Yeah.
So, it depends on who you ask.
Classical theist could be another way of just saying I'm an orthodox Christian with a view of God.
But there's a term of art called classical theism which asserts the view of God as understood in the first couple centuries.
Well, I mean, in their credit, the first millennia or so of Christianity.
Right.
Which is to view God based on Aristotelian understandings of myriology and other, sorry, understandings of how parts work, what metaphysics is.
Basically, if you assume an Aristotelian metaphysic or a Platonic metaphysic, then you're going to be restricted to a classical theist God due to the nature of the way that reality works.
But, if you reject the classical metaphysic, then these problems go away.
So, does it just come down to God's in the ability then?
Yes.
So, in classical theism, God's aseity, his self-sufficiency requires that he be impassable and simple and timeless.
So, that's why they would require certain constraints when we're talking about creation.
Exactly.
Well, that's not true.
I mean, necessarily.
They would argue perhaps God imbued nature with the ability to create systems that look designed.
I mean, that...
Right?
That's kind of...
But, so they're not arguing necessarily for evolution or that it's completely secondary causation.
They're saying that the way that ID arguments work assumes a God that is tinkering.
And God, based on their assessment, cannot tinker.
Or will not tinker.
Or cannot tinker.
I don't know.
It's a very confusing argument.
So, if you can get a handle on it, tell me.
I just need a lot of books is what I'm getting at.
Yeah.
I mean, you need like a PhD level education in philosophy.
Yeah.
It's very difficult to understand.
All right.